even an armchair wanker like me knows, the best answer to this is a claymore mine with steel ball bearings.

The moment I engage a convoy, the trucks stop, the grunts get out and head towards the cover I want them to head for. where the mines are planted

You know, the medics might have a problem matching dogtags to the body after such a shredding.

BTW, a small history lesson, when you TEACH how to react to a truck attack. this sort of jogged my memory because I saw the BBC docu on it.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Narrow_Water_Castle#Narrow_Water_Massacre

any questions?

Thanks for the observation and commentary, Shanks. I remember the Narrow Water Massacre, for personal reasons.

This, of course, is slightly different because the "command center" will be somewhere within the convoy.

What was discussed in the article I shamelessly cut and pasted from is actually cut and pasted directly from US Army doctrinal material that dates back to before Viet Nam and is actually pretty good advice. The ambush point is considered a kill zone and the objective is to get out of it as quickly as possible. What the Army used to do was drive through the kill zone, using fire supression as a means of blowing through, with available air assets called in as needed.

This new version will require the vehicles to remain in place to give covering fire to the dismounts in the fire suppression and fire supremacy phases, with a followup ground assault by the dismounts, and any available air assets, such as gunships, providing additional support.

If additional (now stationary) vehicles are destroyed the command center might well be taken out. Well, that's the chance you take when you leave the vehicles staionary, eh? It just means we won't be seeing any expensive Majors and Colonels commanding convoys.

What this change in doctrine does point out is that the Army has realized that what we've been doing for the last three years hasn't worked.

I had thought that the original response had been to blow as many rounds out as possible, keep moving, and attempt to flank/pursue the ambushers.

I think that there's some sort of miscommunication here, because stopping in a kill zone has been known to be deadly for a long time.

I agree with each of the points you make, except for your first paragraph where the convoys apparently did NOT flank or pursue. The sense I got is that they would try to bull through the ambush and rely upon air assets for suppression or dispersal of attacking elements.

Isn't the whole point of a "comvoy" to move items/logistics under armed guard in order to safeguard the logistical items? The term "convoy" has a different connotation to me than "armed reconnaissance" or "patrol."

I was in the Transportation Corps in Vietnam, so my knowledge of convoy tactics is a little out of date, but I can tell you that the convoys that sustained the most damage were the ones that got bogged down and had to stop. I had friends get shot on the infamous Tay Ninh convoy ambush in August 1968; it was one of those, the trucks stopped dead when one hit a mine, the drivers and people like me who were riding "shotgun" on the trucks shot it out with the VC/NVA until the infantry came in and kicked some ass. As a result of his heroic action in this battle, Sergeant William Seay was awarded, posthumously, the Medal of Honor.

What are the odds that some lame-ass chickenhawk civilian BFEE crony/campaign-contributor -who-was-promised-a-job in Rummy's office came up with this one?

I'd say they're pretty good.

Maybe they should just circle the wagons!

Been a little otherwise occupied, so just saw this on the new convoy tactics.

Oh my freaking sweet Jeebus.

WTF is Schoonemaker thinking???? "Stop and fix" is a good tactic IF the rest of your element uses fire and maneuver to flank the attackers. Kinda hard to do on most of the Iraqi roads I saw.....things like irrigation canals and overpasses get in the way....

Agree 100% with the poster who opined that convoys are for movng things, not acting as combat patrols. My CSC team had enough work from the TRANS COs doing their normal job in a normal shoot and scoot mode; I shudder to think of the casualties we'll see with this new policy.

This is beyond stupid. This is criminal.

Let me add one thing....

We debriefed the 724 TRANS (USAR out of Illinois) after the Abu Gharib run which got waxed, resulting in SGT Matt Maupin's capture (he's still missing....Matt, you won't be forgotten). A good part of the convoy had to stop due to immobilized vehicles, and the security teams and drivers tried their best to fight back. But it became quickly obvious that fire from two sides with no armor backup was ineffective, and the teams bravely moved through the stricken convoy picking up everyone they could see or grab.

Some of the drivers went out the next day on another run, after the BN CDR threw a fit at CFFLCC, and got additional security. They had rotary wing, tracks, and some Strykers.....first major security this fueler CO had seen.....and the drivers all remarked how quiet the run was. Day after that....back to normal "self security"....and it got nasty again .

If we did not learn from that day, and this tactic suggets we did not, what will it take?

Thanks for your observations, Farnsworth, BBTB, and Neil. I guess maybe in an Army of One things are different than they were in the New, Modern, Action Army of the late 60s/early 70s. Or, as one old E-8 Master Blaster described it down at Benning, as "this here fucking thing."

Neil, not all 20 of our readers understand acronyms. I'll hold yer place in line if you want to explain some of them for the civiilian minds.

For some reason, Neil was unable to post this reply, but sent it to me on back channel.

We're having difficulties posting the reply in this thread.