Last month the Armchair Generalist examined the idea of IEDs as weapons in a different light than I’ve ever discussed them. When I’ve written about them it has been solely within the realm of tactical weapons. IEDs are mines – weapons designed to impede or deny passage to an enemy, or to slow his passage through an area, making that enemy vulnerable to further direct attack as we saw when A Company, 2nd.16th Infantry had to travel four miles to a memorial service.
To quote SFC Corey King of the Company A’s 2nd Platoon, who planned the four mile trip, partly mounted and partly on foot, “The pucker factor is pretty high." On the foot portion of the patrol they narrowly escape two IEDs, which are immediately followed with a small arms ambush, including RPGs.
Because of vulnerability to IEDs the troops had been forced to proceed on foot in the classic infantry support of armor and this laid them open to direct fire ambush.
But as the Armchair Generalist pointed out IEDs in Iraq are also strategic weapons in the sense that their impact on public perception far outweighs their impact on US forces. I’m not minimizing the losses US troops have suffered through these weapons – the cost has been high. Perhaps five percent of our casualties stem from these weapons. The influence these weapons have wrought has been most noticed in two areas. Iraqis are well aware of the danger of them and in fact face their own form of IEDs in the daily toll of car bombings.
This daily recitation of bombings in the US and international media is perhaps more horrifying due to the victims: innocent Iraqis trying to go about their daily lives. The explosive effects of car bombings and IEDs guarantees notice in press accounts. It is easily argued that Iraqis are subjected to these bombings for sectarian and religious, or tribal reasons. The purpose of attacking occupation forces is resistance: the slow, steady daily attrition. The discovery of a suspected bomb brings convoys and patrols to an instant halt, delaying or dislocating that unit’s mission, and exposing them to more conventional attack.
The Joint IED Defeat Organization is one of Secretary Rumsfeld’s wilder boondoggles. It’s an office, or maybe rabbit-maze is a better description, of thousands of contractors and think-tanks that has sucked up at least $6.7 Billion to counteract IEDs. Not defeat the bombs themselves, but rather to defeat the impact they have on public perception. A propaganda mill, detailed to produce good news or somehow minimize these IEDs; another welfare teat for private industry. Mr Bu$h is planning to squeeze the teat next year, to the tune of $6.4 Billion.
Judging by all the news reports I’d say it has been wildly unsuccessful. Perhaps you agree.
In Iraq, where the rubber meets the road, the Army and Marines first tried to counter IEDs by uparmoring HumVees. The resistance built bigger bombs. The armored HumVees were augmented by Strykers, which are also vulnereable. Then the services looked for heavier vehicles, obtaining new more resistant vehicles that can withstand the bombs. MRAPs are the current answer.
The Army and Marines have requested $25 Billion to supply upwards of 17,000 MRAPs, vehicles expected to survive the blast of IEDs. There will be different variants, but basically they’re going to be expensive taxis designed to take troops from Point A to Point B in safety.
Leaving aside the human cost, which is incalculable, IEDs will have cost us more than $32 Billion. Two or three years from now we will be discussing uparmoring the MRAPs.
Meanwhile, that’s all money “lost” to future development.
Armchair Generalist, who has a subscription to Defense News quotes from a recent issue:
Functionally, the [Mine Resistant Ambush Protected] is closest to the [Joint Light Tactical Vehicle]. Both are utility vehicles meant to perform the role of a Humvee while adding the kind of protection that can stand up to modern guerrilla weapons. …[S]ome officials with TACOM Life Cycle Management Command, which manages the Army’s vehicle-acquisition efforts, worry that the MRAP program might drain money and people from the JLTV and FCS.
As the TACOM MRAP office ramps up with more money and personnel, and commanders in Iraq express interest in replacing Humvees in the war zone with MRAP, “some here are concerned that MRAP will detract from the JLTV and other programs,” the TACOM official said.
The Future Combat System (FCS) has been on the planning boards for 10 or 15 years, and its future is in jeopardy because of the rapidly escalating costs of keeping troops alive in Iraq. And, as I pointed out above, as the size of IEDs increase to meet the new targets, troops will still have to pass through Iraq’s dark alleys on foot.
Here is another part of the strategic influence of IEDs: As we spend more and more supporting an ever-growing defense industry, whose product costs spiral upward with each generation, there is less and less available to spend on US citizens. Our national infrastructure is already crumbling, and as we have seen over the last six years the Federal Government doesn’t feel any sense of obligation to support the states with give-backs. How are the schools in your town doing these days? Is your town hiring any new policemen or firemen? No, mine isn’t either.
Maybe we should re-think our national tax policy. If we have to be constantly buying ever more expensive weaponry we’re going to need a much larger pocketbook for the Pentagon. Or perhaps not be planning to fight every other country in the world.
UPDATE: Incorrect link fixed. Thanks to J at Armchair Generalist.
Articles on MRAPs:
Marine MRAPs Mired in Minutiae
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