Stirling Newberry clarifies the War of the Bridges with a different focus:

A guerilla army must first neutralize the major military force's advantages of logistics, mobility and firepower, immobilize the major military force, it then procedes [sic] to bleed the major military force and finally shatter the brittle points in the major military force's ability to hold territory and critical points. First don't get killed, then fix in place, then put vulnerable points in exposed positions, and then deliver attacks with disproportionate effect. The occupation will end when the potential profits from the occupation are higher than the costs. Even if the major military force is "winning" on the ground, the key is to deny them the profits of occupation against the costs.

Fade-fix-bleed-shatter is the cycle of guerilla strategy. The major military has the inverse doctrine: ICA (Isolate, Concentrate, Annihilate).

The in the case of the guerilla force, one of the most important processes then, is to grind down the […] combat readiness of individual soldiers in the military. Since defeating a guerilla force requires vigilance and attention, fatigue is a powerful weapon. As importantly, the guerilla war cycle constantly tests the judgment of the people involved. Judgment is the mental capacity which is most clearly degraded by fatigue: the ability to rapidly make choices based on the weighing of large numbers of initially uncorrelated perceptions and pieces of information. As judgment of the major military force degrades, its collateral damage increases, its ability to separate the guerilla force from civilian population decre[a]ses, its ability to take advantage of temporary concentrations of guerillas decreases.

In short, judgment is the crucial quality which allows the major military to occupy, isolate, concentrate. The major military must then maintain judgment in the same way it maintains any other crucial form of readiness.

A surge is a term for a temporary increase in power, in military cases, manpower. This means that the present surge is created and maintained by holding forces in country longer, and by speeding up deployment of forces already scheduled to be sent. As with the 2004 surge with the Fallujah campaign, it has been a dismal failure at the military objectives. According the available information, the US has not secured any of Baghdad. The military situation is, still, a complete stalemate. This is because the very objective of the "surge" was counter to basic doctrine: land is not the key objective. Since Baghdad cannot be physically isolated from the rest of Iraq, removing guerillas from one part of the city merely means they can move to some other part.

It his however burning out the capacity of the occupation forces, and as importantly, it is being paid for by the commensurate reduction in Afghanistan. We are fighting two wars in the Middle East, and losing both of them. It is important to remember that Afghanistan has approximately the same population as Iraq. The basic security requirements will take the same amount of manpower, and since the government that was overthrown by the initial invasion was a cohesive political force, in the long term, the need for political change is going to drive security arrangements.

Mr Newberry’s points, especially the economic implications, are well-taken, although I would argue that control of land is essential to a successful occupation. Implicit with that phrase is the concept of controlling the movement of people. This control can be overt: a system of concentric controls: roadblocks, registration tables, document exam points, and the like. These are signs of an oppressive occupation, and the change to this system from a form of open passage can be understood to be an admission of a failing occupation. The recently announced plan to require all Baghdadis (and eventually all Iraqis) to be biometrically registered and issued with an ID card is the most egregious indicator yet of both the Bu$h malAdministration’s failure in Iraq and its original malign intent. The most recent excuse for conquest – the imposition of “democracy” (at the point of the gun barrel) falls into the trash heap of all the other excuses because of this requirement. Free people living under a democracy do not need roadblocks, identity checkpoints, and infallible ID cards. These are the tools of the oppressive occupier and the dictator.

Soldiers engaged in the oppression of occupation are doing the work of policemen and are unable to do the work they should properly be engaged in: the eradication of armed resistance. The (US) policemen that should be occupying are engaged in protecting logistic convoys to supply the troops. These forces are unequal to the task, and are being reinforced by sailors and airmen. The soldiers’ footsteps as they march run away from Army careers will be echoed by sailors and airmen who have been drafted into assignments they did not enlist for. Thus the failed imperial ambitions of a failed administration will create outward spreading ripples engulfing the other services.

The “surge” to gain control of Baghdad has failed. Because of poor planning its avowed purpose, controlling the Sunni resistance, has failed as the resistance leaders and an estimated 80% of the fighters melted away to surface in another province and continue their struggle there. The “surge” has degenerated into as many attacks against the Sadr Army as can be made, along with an unremitting propaganda campaign against Iran, in a foolish attempt to goad that country into precipitate action. After all, a White House befuddled and humiliated by the inability of a military to occupy, a mission it isn’t trained, equipped or qualified for, might as well start another war of conquest in order to quiet domestic criticism.