While rooting around over at the Foreign Policy Forum, I came across an interesting article by Nicholas Berry. He offers up a levelheaded premise:

Analyzing how wars are won has taken a back seat to measuring the level of violence in Iraq and Afghanistan, as if a mere downturn in violence is the key path to victory. Perhaps one reason for this is that any proper analysis would indicate neither war is winnable, at least by the United States. That Bush administration officials and military commanders are talking about both wars lasting into the indefinite future only confirms that winning them is more than illusive. It is impossible.

...

In an earlier post here, I spoke of a lot of people saying they study history but nobody ever really learning anything from it. I don't know whether they actually believe (stipulating they read the same elementary history texts I did) they have a better idea. Hitler and Russia is a prime example. Yes, I know Hitler was crazy, but did he actually think he could force a surrender before winter set in? Or could it be arrogance, deliberately ignoring the lessons history books impart? Did Hitler expect winter not to arrive in Russia? Did he assume it would not be severe? Did he assume it wouldn't matter, contrary to all previous evidence? Or did he just assume little Germany had the manpower and industrial might to fight wars on so many fronts?

...

[US] Counterinsurgency doctrine calls for a force of over 350,000 to be able to police Iraq. This is not possible under current U.S. force levels. Nor is a dramatic increase in the Army and Marines politically viable. Current plans anticipate only a modest increase in Marine and Army recruitment.

...

General Shinseki told Congress as much before the war (and subsequent occupation) in Iraq. The Army manual backed him up. What made 'those who decide' think they could realize their objective with a third of that force? Ignorance? Arrogance? Greed, and let the consequences be damned? As many who've 'been there and done that' knew in 2002, success could never be attained using the Bush op plan. Whatever the ultimate goal of the invasion might have been, history and experience showed us it could never be attained, long before the first drop of US blood was shed.

... According to the commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan, Gen. Dan K. McNeill, official American military counterinsurgency doctrine stipulates that more than 400,000 troops would be required in Afghanistan.

...

The Soviets had 100,000* troops in Afghanistan and failed miserably, facing the same intractable problems of culture, local economics, and 'outside players' we are now. The Army manual calls for 400,000. What makes 'those who decide' feel they could accomplish the task with 30,000?

Granted, in hindsight, Afghanistan was just the 'entry war', an opportunity to achieve their ultimate goal, the invasion of Iraq. Common knowledge now that the Iraq invasion had been 'on the books' since early 2001, only waiting for an excuse. 11 September was a 'gift from Allah' to the Bush administration.

But as we look at Afghanistan, what did they intend to accomplish? A stalemate, a status quo? Especially knowing the majority of our troops would be deployed toward Iraq in the near future. Aware of the Soviet experience there, how could anyone in their right minds even think about an operation in Afghanistan? Recent history demands us to believe we will leave with our tail between our legs, just as the Soviets did, achieving nothing.

I can even understand the accepted rationale (now that all the lies have been exposed) for going into Iraq; seizing control of the second largest oil reserves on the planet. Moral considerations aside, the payoff would be astounding. But, with that goal in mind, wouldn't you do everything you could to win? Did 'those who decide' actually believe our only combat casualties in Iraq would be from grunts drowning in rose petals? Why didn't we wait for the Army we wanted instead of the Army we had? Mr. Berry again:

...

It is not a stretch to conclude that Iraq and Afghanistan are among the most impossible countries to be politically instituted by foreign forces. And creating a functioning state is what winning is, as defined by the Bush administration. Bush even goes further by adding the element of democracy to the governments he seeks in both. The traditional, divided, antagonistic, and parochial social fabric of Iraq and Afghanistan provides infertile ground for democracy. Whatever political construct finally emerges will only come once foreign forces leave.

And we will leave. Public opinion will eventually force it (think 1972), or the next President will see the futility of it and bring the troops home, or our economy dictates we end the wars or face ruin, as the Soviets did (a bit too late). We will leave both places empty-handed, just as we left Vietnam with nothing but 58,000 corpses.

Our failure to learn from history's lessons is unforgivable. Our decision to ignore them is criminal.

Update:

Ranger, with a great post up on the situation in Afghanistan, leaves us with this thought:

...

If NATO and the U.S. haven't alleviated the problem to date, then that should tell us something beyond the meaningless rhetoric that supports this Phony War on Terror (PWOT ©).

...

We can't win, and rearranging the geology isn't going to win it for us. Time to go, because if we haven't killed Osama and rolled up al-Qaeda by now, odds are we never will.

*Source: Global Security.org