Actually, it's not the Iraq Survey Group, but, the same crew that advised the original ISG... The United States Institute of Peace(pdf) released a nine page brief entitled "Iraq After the Surge: Options and Questions." Basically, they conclude that political progress is "so slow, halting and superficial" and political fragmentation "so pronounced" that the United States is no closer to being able to leave Iraq than it was a year ago.

Here's some of their key findings:

An Improved But Still Fragile Situation

The emerging political reality in Iraq is a weak and divided central government with limited governing capacity. Mistrust among leaders in Baghdad remains high. Key ministerial posts have remained unfilled for months. Important legislation—on de-Ba’athification, amnesty, provincial powers and the budget—has passed, but implementation is uneven. The Iraqi security forces have been strengthened but remain far from able to sustain themselves or fight insurgents and militias on their own. Mixed loyalties within the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) continue to pose a threat.

Current Policy

The current U.S. commitment level to Iraq is full and unconditional. It is "full" in the sense that the U.S. is making a major military, political and financial commitment, one that is straining U.S. resources. It is "unconditional" in that the U.S. has not tied support for the Iraqi government to its performance, which has fallen short.

The current policy has three shortcomings:

• Gains may be tenuous. Much of its success is due to factors that are outside U.S. control and therefore subject to change. This includes the JAM ceasefire and the Awakenings’ continued willingness to cooperate. Empowering the Awakenings—often composed of former insurgents and leaders stridently opposed to the Iraqi government—carries with it a major risk of blowback.
• No political solution. Political progress is so slow, halting and superficial, and social and political fragmentation so pronounced, that the US is no closer to being able to leave Iraq than it was a year ago. Lasting political development could take five to ten years of full, unconditional U.S. commitment to Iraq.
• The cost is high. The U.S. commitment to Iraq carries a massive cost, both human and financial, in addition to the global interests the U.S. is sacrificing to its commitment in Iraq. Even if progress in Iraq continues, the results may not be worth the cost.

Now, getting to the meat of the report:

If the U.S. is unable or unwilling to sustain a full, unconditional commitment to Iraq, it will need to look for alternative policies that reduce U.S. commitment but protect at least some of its vital interests. Two alternatives stand out: a reduced, conditional commitment and an unconditional, near-total reduction of military commitment.

What? No Surge? What were they thinking...

Reduced, Conditional Commitment

• Summary: Make future U.S. support for the Iraqi government conditional on achievement of a few minimal political goals, resulting in a decentralized system with a weak central government supported by a much-reduced U.S. presence.

Basis: The U.S. military posture needed to support security gains in Iraq is unlikely to be sustained beyond 2008. Reductions in troop levels will likely result in some degree of chaos and violence no matter what. The decentralized, fragmented political dynamic in Iraq cannot be reversed. The establishment of a central government in Baghdad that can take over the U.S. security role will not happen in the time available.

Unconditional, Near-total Reduction of U.S. Military Commitment

• Summary: Unconditional redeployment of all deployed U.S. forces from Iraq, coupled with an enhanced security presence in the region, an invigorated diplomatic effort, and continuing political support to the Iraqi government

Basis: The continued presence of U.S. forces in Iraq cannot produce an outcome worth the costs in lives and resources. Moreover, the broader global interests that the U.S. is sacrificing due to its presence in Iraq far outweigh any gains that could possibly be achieved there. This option would include:
• A firm, non-negotiable timetable for withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Iraq that has no relation to the Iraqi political environment and is not subject to change (for example, withdrawal to begin in January 2009 and be completed in January 2011).
• Enhanced U.S. military presence in the Gulf and maintenance of U.S. ability to intervene from outside of Iraq
• Rebuilt regional alliances
• Within the limits allowed by withdrawal of deployed U.S. forces, a U.S. diplomatic and assistance presence inside Iraq, including a train and equip mission managed by the Office of Defense Cooperation in the U.S. embassy

Iraq's Neighbors

It is important that the U.S. continue to engage with all of Iraq’s neighbors, in particular Iran and Saudi Arabia. To date, the efforts in this regard appear to have been sporadic and less than wholehearted. The U.S. needs sharper focus on what it wants from Iran and Saudi Arabia and what leverage it has with them. There simply is no way to stabilize Iraq without a minimum of cooperation from Iran, whose long and largely open border with Iraq presents multitudinous opportunities for Iranian influence, as do the cultural affinities between Iran and Shiite Iraq. Saudi Arabia has shown a friendlier face to Iraq in recent months, but it continues to hesitate in establishing substantial diplomatic relations and in settling bilateral debt issues.

I'll let you read about the 14 questions they recommend our Congress Critters to ask of Betrayus and Crock O' Shit starting Tuesday... Enjoy! And pass the popcorn...!