An article posted yesterday at the MNF-I website describes the Sons of Iraq indoctrination program. The program consists of six phases that lasts for 240 days. As the article pointedly starts off...

“The Government of Iraq is giving you an opportunity to reconcile. Take it,” Lt. Col. Christopher Vanek, 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade, 10th Mountain Division said to those attending. “If you aren’t here to reconcile – I’ll see you again, on the battlefield.”[...] “Your sheik, neighbor and village have spoken,” Vanek said. “They want peace.”[...] The program locals refer to as ‘Musalaha’, has been instrumental along with the Sons of Iraq program with the over 90 percent decrease in violent attacks against ISF, CF and civilians in the Hawijah District...[...] Additionally, the successful lethal efforts of 1-87 and other CFs in sync with non-lethal methods are key to the security successes in the region and the motivating factor in persuading more Iraqis in the area to “lay down their arms and join the reconciliation process,” according to Vanek.

Strong words there!

(the petitioners)initial contact by Iraqi Security Forces, Coalition forces and local leadership to the first meeting where the program is laid-out and questions are fielded. Petitioners are also to provide personal information.[...]

In step two, the candidates return to be vetted, biometrically registered and entered into a data base. At this juncture, they are given a “temporary respite from targeting.” The respite is part of the ‘no targeting agreement’, which occurs between the second and third steps, at which point the information obtained during step two is processed and verified.

Step three is the ‘no activity and no negative reporting period’ where the candidate is expected to cooperate with ISF and CF, and assist with the peace process by providing information on criminal activity occurring in their respective communities.

In steps four through six, an accounting board made up of local government, ISF, CF leadership and a designated sponsor; determine the way ahead for the petitioner. If successful, a public declaration of allegiance to the Government of Iraq is made by the participant and further monitoring for a set period of time is undertaken.

It seems the Colonel's optimistic propaganda is disputed by this current LA Times article...

The rise and fall of a Sons of Iraq warrior

A year ago, Sunni Arab fighter Abu Abed led an improbable revolt against Al Qaeda in Iraq. As he killed its leaders and burned down hide-outs, he became a symbol of a new group called the Sons of Iraq -- the man who dared to stand up to the extremists in Baghdad when it still ranked as a suicidal act.[...]

Abu Abed's rise and fall encapsulates the complexities of the U.S.-funded Sons of Iraq program. Although the Shiite-led Iraqi government has regarded the Sons of Iraq as little more than a front for insurgent groups, the Sunni fighters' war helped end the cycle of car bombings and reprisal killings by Shiite militias that had sent Baghdad headlong into civil war. America's new friends also helped bring down the death rate of U.S. forces in Iraq.

The Defense Department's report to Congress last week emphasized the vital nature of the program, saying, "The emergence of the Sons of Iraq to help secure local communities has been one of the most significant developments in the past 18 months in Iraq."

Abu Abed's flight into exile shines a light on a violent power struggle pitting upstart leaders like him against Iraq's entrenched Sunni political elite and its Shiite-dominated government. The frictions could easily shatter the Sons of Iraq -- and open the door to Al Qaeda in Iraq's resurgence.[...]

Abu Abed's defenders, including some U.S. military officers, suggest that the fighter earned enemies for upsetting Baghdad's status quo as he brought former insurgents into an alliance with the Americans.

In recent months, Abu Abed had been organizing like-minded fighters around Baghdad and northern Iraq for provincial elections in the fall. U.S. officers believe his transition to politics could have proved the last straw for the government.

"Certainly you can draw the conclusion because he was getting involved in the political process to engage Sons of Iraq leaders to form a political party, the Iraqi government actively targeted him," said a U.S. military officer, who declined to give his name because of the subject's sensitivity. "I don't know that I can say it outright, but it certainly does seem that way."

Amid the political skirmishing, the committee set up to integrate U.S.-backed Sunni fighters into the security forces and public works jobs has stalled.

Iraqi officials have been cryptic about the reason. Sheikhly acknowledged that the committee's efforts had slowed to a crawl, but said it was because the committee had shuffled members.

I've posted before on Maliki's little schemes, he truly fails to grasp the need to integrate the various sects, rather than target them as he's demonstrated with the various operations. Maliki needs to go or to be severely reined in. As Dr iRack sums it up...

The "Green Zone parties" are clearly worried that an emerging cadre of leaders at the local level will start to undermine their grip on power in the provincial elections, setting up a potential clash between the "powers that be" and the "powers that aren't" (local and tribal entities) in the months ahead. This is true of the continuing intra-Shia clashes between Dawa/ISCI and the Sadrists, and it will likely become increasingly apparent between the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) and Sunni tribal and SoI groups.

Troubling.

Troubling indeed...!