Some memorable quotes from that clip:

"We have juveniles from 14 to 18. ... They're IED makers. They are dangerous people."[...]

"How old are you?" he is asked.

"Nine years old."[...]

"These juveniles are treated very well," insists the soldier. "We invite their parents to come and visit with them. They actually have movie nights. ... We have looked through every one of these files. These juveniles are dangerous."

Another memorable quip from the Iraqi Doctor that led the procession:

"What do you expect? We're an occupied country with a puppet government..."

Speaks volumes don't you think?

In other Iraq related articles, Gareth Porter wrote...

U.S. Officials Admit Worry over a ‘Difficult’ al-Maliki

U.S. officials privately admit being concerned that Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al- Maliki has become "overconfident" about his government’s ability to manage without U.S. combat troops, according to an Iraq analyst who just returned from a trip to Iraq arranged by U.S. commander General David Petraeus.

Colin Kahl, a fellow at the Centre for a New American Security (CNAS) -- which has supported a long-term U.S. military presence in Iraq -- told the press this week that there was "a certain degree of grudging respect for al- Maliki" among officials with whom we met, "but more often concern about his emerging overconfidence which is making it difficult to interact with him."

That assessment contrasts with statements of George W. Bush administration officials implying that al-Maliki’s public demands for a timetable for U.S. military withdrawal are merely negotiating ploys or political grandstanding.

Ironically, as much as I despise al Maliki, I do have to defend him against the typical misconception that he's demanding a timetable recently only for political purposes... Many fail to realize that Maliki has advocated for a timetable almost since assuming the mantle of Prez as evidenced by this 2006 WaPo OpEd penned by his National Security Adviser...

The Way Out of Iraq: A Road Map

By Mowaffak al-Rubaie
Tuesday, June 20, 2006; Page A17

There has been much talk about a withdrawal of U.S. and coalition troops from Iraq, but no defined timeline has yet been set. There is, however, an unofficial "road map" to foreign troop reductions that will eventually lead to total withdrawal of U.S. troops. This road map is based not just on a series of dates but, more important, on the achievement of set objectives for restoring security in Iraq.[...]

All the governors have been notified and briefed on the end objective. The current prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, has approved the plan, as have the coalition forces, and assessments of each province have already been done

Now, getting back to Porter's article, I need to dispel another myth that keeps recurring...

Even more important, however, Al-Maliki’s power position has also been bolstered by the decisions by nationalist Shiite leader Moqtada al-Sadr not to launch a concerted military resistance to U.S. and Iraqi government campaigns to weaken his Mahdi Army in 2007 and then to give up his political-military power positions in Basra, Sadr City and Amarah in 2008 without having been militarily defeated.

Petraeus and the U.S. military command in Iraq have asserted that al-Sadr’s decisions reflected the fact that the Mahdi Army had been weakened by U.S. military pressures. However, the broader set of developments over the past year suggests that the primary reason for Sadr’s willingness to give up military resistance was a strategic understanding with Iran to shift to political and diplomatic resistance to the U.S. military presence.

High officials in the al-Maliki regime asserted repeatedly last fall that it was Iran’s intervention with al-Sadr that brought about the unilateral ceasefire of Aug. 27, 2007. Sadr’s decisions to give up military control of Basra and Sadr City before his forces were defeated were taken in the context of Iranian mediation between al-Sadr and the al-Maliki regime.

Iran’s strategic relationship with al-Sadr accomplished what the U.S. military never believed would be possible even in its most optimistic scenario -- the neutralisation of the most potent political-military threat to the regime’s stability. The ability of Iran to deliver that benefit to al-Maliki -- as part of a broader shift to an anti-occupation regime policy -- almost certainly strengthened the case that Iran made to al-Maliki for a demand for a timetable for U.S. troop withdrawal in the status of forces negotiations.

Al Sadr is diametrically opposed to Iran just as much as he's opposed to our occupation...

As Juan Cole wrote about Porter's interview with Kahl...

Kahl: Iran Tamed Mahdi Army

4. Muqtada al-Sadr agreed to a ceasefire last September and is turning his Mahdi Army into a civilian social-work force under strong Iranian pressure. The Iranians seem to be convinced that the Mahdi Army was becoming a pretext for the US to stay in Iraq (and of course the Bushies were blaming Iran for everything Muqtada did). (Kahl did not note, but I want to, that Iran is mainly allied with Abdul Aziz al-Hakim and his Badr corps paramilitary, which has become the backbone of al-Maliki's security forces; Iran thus has multiple reasons for trying to get rid of the Mahdi Army as a military force).

Question: Is there a third reason Iran pressured al-Sadr on this matter? Is there a secret, informal agreement between Bush and Khamenei that if the Mahdi Army quietens down, the US will talk to Iran, will refrain from bombing the nuclear facilities at Natanz, and will forestall an Israeli attack, as well? Just speculation on my part-- I'm not asserting, just wondering.

Juan Cole also pointed out another frightening scenario...

2. Al-Maliki is not only refusing to incorporate the Sunni Arab Awakening Councils or "Sons of Iraq" into the Iraqi security forces, but may actually be planning to make war on them. These are Sunni Arab militias, many former Salafi or nationalist guerrillas, who have agreed to take a salary from the US and to fight the Qutbist vigilantes ('al-Qaeda in Iraq'):

' Kahl said in the briefing that, of the 103,000 Sunnis belonging to those militias, the Iraqi government had promised to take into the security forces only about 16,000. But in fact, it has approved only 600 applicants thus far, according to Kahl, and most of those have turned out to be Shi’a rather than Sunni militiamen.'

[I've also been told by knowledgeable Iraqi Shiites that the Awakening Councils are the biggest threat Baghdad faces and that when the Americans are weaker in Iraqi it will be necessary to "take care of them.")

That does not bode well for Iraq...