Listening to McBush at today's VFW meeting in Florida and hearing him say time after time that the Surge was a smashing success nauseates me to the point that I need to refute his bile...

First, here's the 18 benchmarks the Iraq Survey Group presented to Congress and was enacted as the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007 (Enrolled as Agreed to or Passed by Both House and Senate) [H.R.2206.ENR]....

(A) The United States strategy in Iraq, hereafter, shall be conditioned on the Iraqi government meeting benchmarks, as told to members of Congress by the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and reflected in the Iraqi Government's commitments to the United States, and to the international community, including:

(i) Forming a Constitutional Review Committee and then completing the constitutional review.

(ii) Enacting and implementing legislation on de-Baathification.

(iii) Enacting and implementing legislation to ensure the equitable distribution of hydrocarbon resources of the people of Iraq without regard to the sect or ethnicity of recipients, and enacting and implementing legislation to ensure that the energy resources of Iraq benefit Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, Kurds, and other Iraqi citizens in an equitable manner.

(iv) Enacting and implementing legislation on procedures to form semi-autonomous regions.

(v) Enacting and implementing legislation establishing an Independent High Electoral Commission, provincial elections law, provincial council authorities, and a date for provincial elections.

(vi) Enacting and implementing legislation addressing amnesty.

(vii) Enacting and implementing legislation establishing a strong militia disarmament program to ensure that such security forces are accountable only to the central government and loyal to the Constitution of Iraq.

(viii) Establishing supporting political, media, economic, and services committees in support of the Baghdad Security Plan.

(ix) Providing three trained and ready Iraqi brigades to support Baghdad operations.

(x) Providing Iraqi commanders with all authorities to execute this plan and to make tactical and operational decisions, in consultation with U.S commanders, without political intervention, to include the authority to pursue all extremists, including Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias.

(xi) Ensuring that the Iraqi Security Forces are providing even handed enforcement of the law.

(xii) Ensuring that, according to President Bush, Prime Minister Maliki said `the Baghdad security plan will not provide a safe haven for any outlaws, regardless of [their] sectarian or political affiliation'.

(xiii) Reducing the level of sectarian violence in Iraq and eliminating militia control of local security.

(xiv) Establishing all of the planned joint security stations in neighborhoods across Baghdad.

(xv) Increasing the number of Iraqi security forces units capable of operating independently.

(xvi) Ensuring that the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi legislature are protected.

(xvii) Allocating and spending $10 billion in Iraqi revenues for reconstruction projects, including delivery of essential services, on an equitable basis.

(xviii) Ensuring that Iraq's political authorities are not undermining or making false accusations against members of the Iraqi Security Forces.

Now, here's a synopsis of the Surge by many of the same individuals that made up the ISG...

Advocates of the 2007 surge of U.S. troops into Iraq argued that the infusion would provide the much-needed political space for Iraq’s leaders to produce legislation and accommodation that would lead the nation towards meaningful reconciliation. Yet, throughout the second half of 2007, even as the rate of Iraqi civilian casualties dropped precipitously, little progress, either in the form of national legislation or political compromise, was perceptible. In fact, in the year leading up to February 13, 2008 only one piece of "benchmark" legislation was enacted into law—the Law on Accountability and Justice (De-Ba’athification), which though hoped would reform the current De-Ba’athification regime—one of the most divisive institutions in post-Saddam Iraq—instead "essentially preserved the previous De-Ba’athification system," and in any event has so far done little to promote political progress or reconciliation. During this same period, the Constitutional Review Committee, despite multiple extensions, failed to deliver a final set of recommendations to Parliament. The hydrocarbon and revenue sharing laws never even made it to the parliamentary floor. And the Article 140 deadline for a referendum on the status of Kirkuk (and other disputed territories) came and went with neither a referendum nor any meaningful progress towards a political solution. At the beginning of 2008, one could have reasonably wondered whether the surge, despite its successes, would in the end amount to little more than another squandered opportunity—that Iraqi leaders would fail to seize the moment and produce anything of meaning for the Iraqi people.

Even the GAO agreed with the missed opportunities...

The New Way Forward responded to failures in prior strategies that prematurely transferred security responsibilities to Iraqi forces or belatedly responded to growing sectarian violence. Overall violence, as measured by enemy-initiated attacks, fell about 70 percent in Iraq, from about 180 attacks per day in June 2007 to about 50 attacks per day in February 2008. Security gains have largely resulted from (1) the increase in U.S. combat forces, (2) the creation of nongovernmental security forces such as Sons of Iraq, and (3) the Mahdi Army's declaration of a cease fire. Average daily attacks were at higher levels in March and April before declining in May 2008. The security environment remains volatile and dangerous. The number of trained Iraqi forces has increased from 323,000 in January 2007 to 478,000 in May 2008; many units are leading counterinsurgency operations. However, the Department of Defense reported in March 2008 that the number of Iraqi units capable of performing operations without U.S. assistance has remained at about 10 percent. Several factors have complicated the development of capable security forces, including the lack of a single unified force, sectarian and militia influences, and continued dependence on U.S. and coalition forces. The Iraqi government has enacted key legislation to return some Ba'athists to government, give amnesty to detained Iraqis, and define provincial powers. However, it has not yet enacted other important legislation for sharing oil resources or holding provincial elections. Efforts to complete the constitutional review have also stalled. A goal of The New Way Forward was to facilitate the Iraqis' efforts to enact all key legislation by the end of 2007. Between 2005 and 2007, Iraq spent only 24 percent of the $27 billion it budgeted for its own reconstruction efforts. More specifically, Iraq's central ministries, responsible for security and essential services, spent only 11 percent of their capital investment budgets in 2007--down from similarly low rates of 14 and 13 percent in the 2 prior years. Violence and sectarian strife, shortage of skilled labor, and weak procurement and budgeting systems have hampered Iraq's efforts to spend its capital budgets. Although oil production has improved for short periods, the May 2008 production level of about 2.5 million barrels per day (mbpd) was below the U.S. goal of 3 mbpd. The daily supply of electricity met only about half of demand in early May 2008. Conversely, State reports that U.S. goals for Iraq's water sector are close to being reached. The unstable security environment, corruption, and lack of technical capacity have contributed to the shortfalls. The Departments disagreed with our recommendation, stating that The New Way Forward strategy remains valid but the strategy shall be reviewed and refined as necessary. We reaffirm the need for an updated strategy given the important changes that have occurred in Iraq since January 2007. An updated strategy should build on recent gains, address unmet goals and objectives and articulate the U.S. strategy beyond July 2008.

Btw, about those "Sons of Iraq"...

The Shiite-led government is cracking down on U.S.-backed Sunni Arab fighters in one of Iraq’s most turbulent regions, arresting some leaders, disarming dozens of men and banning them from manning checkpoints except alongside official security forces.[...]

Mullah Shihab al-Safi, commander of Sunni fighters in Diyala, told The Associated Press that many senior leaders of his group had been detained and fighters evicted from their offices. He gave no figures.

Another senior commander said security forces evicted his men from all but seven of some 100 offices in Diyala. He spoke on condition of anonymity because he feared arrest.

The U.S. military confirmed the Diyala actions but gave few details. Fighters were only pushed out of buildings they did not own, a military spokesman, Capt. Matt Rodano, said.[...]

Government officials would not comment on specific claims about the push in Diyala. But aides close to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a Shiite, said the government was not willing to tolerate the existence of armed groups with “blood on their hands.”

“The continuation of the Awakening Councils as they are now is unacceptable,” said Ali al-Adeeb, a close al-Maliki aide and a senior member of his Dawa Party.

A top Iraqi security official with access to classified information said authorities were especially suspicious of the Diyala groups because many of their estimated 14,000 fighters had been members of al-Qaida in Iraq.

Don't you feel the love between Maliki and the Sunni...?

Since, McBush considers Betrayus his hero, let's take a look at how he testified to Congress as to what victory in Iraq would look like...

WEXLER: Please tell us, General, what is winning?

PETRAEUS: Well, first of all -- first of all, Congress, let me tell you that what we are fighting for is national interest. It is interest that, as I stated, have to do with Al Qaida, a sworn enemy of the United States and the free world; it has to do with the possible spread of sectarian conflict in Iraq, conflict that had engulfed that country and had it on the bring of civil war; it has to do with region stability of a region that is of critical importance to the global economy; and it has to do with, certainly, the influence of Iran, another, obviously, very important element in that region.

In terms of what it is that we are trying to achieve, I think, simply, it is a country that is at piece with itself and its neighbors. It is a country that can defend itself, that has a government that is reasonably representative and broadly responsive to its citizens, and a country that is involved in, engaged in, again, the global economy.
Ambassador Crocker and I, for what it's worth, have typically seen ourselves as minimalists. We're not after the Holy Grail in Iraq, we're not after Jeffersonian democracy; we're after conditions that would allow our soldiers to disengage, and that is, in fact, what we are doing as we achieve progress, as we have with the surge, and that is what is indeed allowing us to withdraw the surge forces -- again, well over one-quarter of our ground combat power, five of 20 brigade combat teams, plus two Marine battalions and the Marine Expeditionary Unit by the end of July.

Ambassador Crocker and I, for what it's worth, have typically seen ourselves as minimalists. We're not after the Holy Grail in Iraq, we're not after Jeffersonian democracy; we're after conditions that would allow our soldiers to disengage, and that is, in fact, what we are doing as we achieve progress, as we have with the surge, and that is what is indeed allowing us to withdraw the surge forces -- again, well over one-quarter of our ground combat power, five of 20 brigade combat teams, plus two Marine battalions and the Marine Expeditionary Unit by the end of July.

I love the frankness, Betrayus! Yeppers, McInsane, the Surge was a resounding success! May you wear those laurels with pride...!

Please! Alms for the poor...!